Plain Language Patents by Feldman, Robin
University of California, Hastings College of the Law





UC Hastings College of the Law, feldmanr@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
















I. Protecting the Structure of the Dialogue ....................................................... 289
II. Speaking a Com m on Language .................................................................... 290
III. A voiding Structural Insularity ....................................................................... 298
IV . C onclusion .................................................................................................... 304
I. Protecting the Structure of the Dialogue
[W]e can only convince an interlocutor if at some point he shares
our understanding of the language concerned. If he does not,
there is no further step to take in rational argument ....
- Charles Taylor'
Law is a process of Bounded Adaptation.2 The law that exists at any given
moment is constantly driven to adapt to changing circumstances within the
framework of what has gone before. The boundaries of that framework are policed
by the necessity of articulating an interpretation in a way that gains general
acceptance. It is the need to effectively articulate a common logic that mitigates the
distortion of personal perspective. This articulation and confirmation is essential in
a system that claims allegiance to precedent, and it reinforces our ability to serve
that allegiance.
This process of Bounded Adaptation cannot proceed effectively without an
adequately structured dialogue that will promote the flow of information and
Professor of Law, Director, Law & Bioscience Project, U.C. Hastings College of the Law. I wish
to thank participants in the Annual Intellectual Property Scholars' Conference, the Chicago
Intellectual Property Colloquium, and the Stanford Program in Law, Science, and Technology for
their comments. An expanded version of this essay is included in a chapter of my book, ROBIN
FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (Oxford University Press) (forthcoming March 2009).
Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 110, 112-13 (3d ed. 1998) (comparing the Hegelian rationalist approach
and the empiricist approach to "breaking out" from the "circle of illusion" comprising the
individual's own isolated intuitive perspective and the consequent inability to see other
perspectives).
2 For a detailed elaboration of the notion of Bounded Adaptation in the context of twentieth century
legal theories, see FELDMAN, supra note *.
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analysis. Expounding a common logic and testing it through the various spheres of
acceptance requires a medium of communication that allows a meaningful
exchange.
Nowhere is this dialogue more challenging than at the intersection where law
and science interact in the form of patents. When the subject of the case is wrapped
in complex and unfamiliar terms, it is tremendously difficult for legal actors to
grapple with the theoretical content of the dispute. There is a temptation to parrot
language from the briefs rather than wrestle with and triumph over the essence of
the problem and its implications for the unfolding legal doctrines.
Communication at the intersection of law and science will always be
tremendously challenging. Nevertheless, there are elements of the current patent
system that substantially exacerbate the problem. These include a deeply engrained
tradition in which patent language is written in complex codes and an inclination
towards increasing structural insularity for the courts that hear patent cases.
If legal actors lack sufficient information to develop doctrinal adaptations and
to test those adaptations, the communication that is essential for the development of
effective legal doctrine can easily break down. Given the challenges of effective
dialogue at the law and science interface, the law should move towards requiring
that patent drafters describe scientific and technological issues in plain language,
wherever possible. Plain language patents will not solve the myriad of problems
involved in patent interpretation. Nevertheless, at this critical juncture where law
and science must interact, appropriately structuring the dialogue will be essential
for ensuring the adequate unfolding of legal doctrines.
II. Speaking a Common Language
In patent drafting, which embodies some of the most challenging aspects of
translation at the law and science interface, a move towards plain language would
be a significant improvement. If legal actors cannot understand the full
implications of the terms being used, they cannot do an adequate job of considering
the legal questions surrounding the precedents. They are, in essence, flying blind.
In explaining this proposal, it is important to note that most legal actors have
no scientific expertise. District court judges charged with patent interpretation are
unlikely to have any scientific expertise.3 The same is true for the jurors, who must
decide other elements of patent cases.4 Even the specialized judges of the Federal
Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use of
Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 254 (1995) (discussing
that district court judges in many cases do not have the expertise needed to try patent cases).
[VOL. 17:289
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Circuit may have little knowledge or experience relevant to a particular case.5
Most Federal Circuit judges have neither a technical background nor patent
experience when they are appointed to the bench.6 For those who do have some
scientific training, their training may have occurred decades before, an eternity
away from modem computer and genetic technologies.
Finally, whatever training a judge may have will relate to certain areas of
patent law but not to others. As one commentator noted, "A patent litigation
relating to a modem chipset bears little resemblance to a case where the invention
at issue is the derivation of a yeast species for the production of a recombinant
protein nutritional supplement that makes farm-raised salmon pink."7  For those
without a science background, it is easy to assume that training and expertise in one
scientific field confers wisdom in all scientific fields. Other than perhaps creating a
lack of fear, however, knowledge in one scientific area does not necessarily
translate into knowledge in another.
Some judges are remarkably skilled at translating scientific lingo into
concepts that can be molded into legal doctrine.8 For most legal actors, however,
the challenge of penetrating scientific jargon creates a tendency to defer to
scientists and to avoid delving deeply into the essence of the case.9
Parroting technical language can obscure an inability to grasp the full
meaning and implications of an issue. It creates the temptation to engage in a form
of sophistry, to speak in what Nussbaum describes, in the context of philosophy, as
a seductive, jargon-filled way that leads us to believe we have mastered something
deep for having learned to use the jargon. 1 We cannot effectively engage in the
process of interpretation and adaptation unless we are speaking a common
language.
Jargon is also the perfect vehicle for strategic behavior. It allows legal actors
to use broad open-ended language and then argue later that whatever position they
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 18 (2001) (noting that "only four of the twelve active Federal Circuit judges have
technical backgrounds").
6 Id.
7 Lawrence M. Sung, Strangers in a Strange Land: Specialized Courts Resolving Patent Disputes,
Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 27, 28-29.
8 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(Posner, J., sitting by designation), affd, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
9 Moore, supra note 5, at 18.
10 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv.
1627, 1641 (1993); see also ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 264 (1979) (noting that esoteric scientific terminology separates the
laity from understanding and the "population at large has become ripe for new mysticisms clothed
in apparently scientific jargon").
2009]
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wish surely falls within the language chosen.1" As one international patent
examiner noted in frustration, "In these claims, the numerous variables and their
voluminous, complex meanings and their seemingly endless permutations, makes it
virtually impossible to determine the full scope and complete meaning of the
claimed subject matter. . . [and thus,] it is impossible to carry out a meaningful
search on same."
' 12
The problem is not just that patents are written using scientific language;
patents also are written in the form of an arcane code. Claims are written in a
single sentence, 13 making the language tremendously convoluted. In addition,
words have particularized meanings 14 that will be understood only by the properly
initiated.
For example, patent applicants must describe the best mode of making their
invention. 15 In describing that mode, applicants may explain a manner and process
of making the invention that they have not actually engaged in but that they believe
is the best mode.' 6 The code for signaling the difference between work that an
inventor has actually engaged in and work that an inventor has not involves verb
tense. 17
Subtle verb changes are unlikely to mean much to the uninitiated, regardless
of whether that person has a science degree. It would be so much clearer and
simpler if the patent applicant said, "This is an example of what we believe the best
mode of making the invention should be, although we have not yet performed each
step in this precise order."
See Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor's Contribution, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, T 24 n.24
(2005) (noting that the emergence of the separate written description doctrine reflected concerns
about patent holders who mark out broad territory with their claims and then fill in information
later, either as their own research advances or as they see the research of others advance).
12 Derek Lowe, The Examiner Finally Snaps, CORANTE, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.corante.com/
pipeline/archives/2006/01/24/the examiner finallysnaps.php (quoting a patent examiner who
was charged with writing a search report on a patent application for the nations that belong to the
Patent Cooperation Treaty).
13 Ana Cristina Almeida Mfiller, Nei Pereira Jr. & Adelaide Maria de Souza Antunes, Protecting
Biotechnological Inventions in Brazil and A broad: Draft, Scope, and Interpretation of Claims, 13
ALB. L.J. Sci.& TECH. 145, 158 (2002).
See, e.g., Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 493 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that a patentee my act as his own lexicographer and use a term in a manner that is
contrary to its ordinary meaning, sometimes even without an explicit statement that redefines the
term (citing Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268
(Fed. Cir. 2001))).
15 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
16 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(p) (8th ed., rev. 6 2007) (stating that
simulated or predicted test results and prophetical examples satisfy the best mode requirement).
Work that an inventor has not done yet is known as a paper example. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1375 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting id.).
1 Hoffman-La Roche, 323 F.3d at 1364 (upholding a finding of misrepresentation based on a patent
holder's use of past tense to indicate predicted results, rather than results actually obtained).
[VOL. 17:289
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Patent law's word interpretation can be downright incomprehensible under
common sense notions of language. For example, in the recent case of Baldwin
Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., the Federal Circuit interpreted the phrase "a
pre-soaked fabric roll."' 8 In overturning the lower court's interpretation of the
phrase, the Federal Circuit explained that the indefinite article "a" can mean "one
or more" unless the patent holder evinces a clear intent to limit the meaning of the
word. 19 The court noted the following: "That 'a' or 'an' can mean 'one or more' is
best described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a
convention.
' 2 °
Patent law is full of such code-like communication. For example, suppose a
patent holder describes an invention as comprising x, y, and z components. Now,
one might think that the invention is made up of only x, y, and z. Not so.
"Comprising" is in an open-ended code word representing the fact that the
invention could include elements not actually listed. 21 The word "consisting" is the
proper code word used to indicate that the elements listed are the only elements.22
Rather than trying to parse the difference between an invention "comprising"
something and an invention "consisting" of something, one could simply use plain
language to explain that the components "include but are not limited to the
following." A plain language description not only communicates more clearly to
those who must interpret the patent, it also increases the pressure on patent holders
to actually define what they are trying to claim, rather than leaving the claim open-
ended with the intention of filling in the gaps as other products emerge on the
market. 23
Most importantly, plain language allows judges to more easily understand the
implications of their decisions and puts pressure on judges to take responsibility for
those decisions. In particular, for judges who do have technical expertise, a plain
language system avoids the temptation to suggest "we in the club know it when we
see it, and that is good enough." The requirement for clear and plain
communication keeps legal actors faithful to supportable logic rather than subject to
the whims of prejudice masked in obscurity.
18 Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
19 Id. at 1342 (quoting KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
20 Id.
21 Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that using
the word "comprising" in a patent is a "signal" that the list of items in the group is open-ended);
Shanshan Zhang, Proposing Resolutions to the Insufficient Gene Patent System, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1139, 1157-58 & n.148 (2004).
22 Gillette, 405 F.3d at 1372; Jorge A. Goldstein & Elina Golod, Human Gene Patents, 77 ACAD.
MED. 1315, 1319 (2002).
23 See Zhang, supra note 21, at 1157-58 (stating that open-ended claims provide patentees with
negotiating advantage over downstream product developers).
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It is ironic that in our efforts to increase the status of the legal system, we risk
creating the opposite effect. As one scholar has noted in the social science world,
using ordinary words with specialized meanings has a tendency to evoke
contempt.24 Those outside the specialized field frequently respond with anger or
condescending amusement. 25  Yet the legal system is using such specialized
meanings in a forum that can never contain only relevant specialists. To the extent
that the coded language flows from patent law, it risks drawing the contempt of
inventors who see the system as strangely distorted. To the extent the coded
language flows from scientific usage, it risks drawing the contempt of the non-
scientists who must ponder the cases, including judges, law clerks, and jurors, not
to mention members of Congress and the popular press. Thus, the specialized code
language of the patent law system may be ineffective not only as an approach to a
properly functioning legal system, but also as a method of enhancing law's image.
The legal system already has a good model for requiring that participants
draft in plain language. Since 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has required companies to draft key sections of their disclosure documents in
plain language.2 6 The program has turned ponderous, impenetrable documents into
more understandable communications.2 7 The same spirit, although perhaps not
precisely the same approach, could be applied to patents.
As with the SEC's program, implementing a plain language standard for
patents might be possible with regulatory action, rather than legislative action. The
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has authority to govern the conduct of
proceedings before its office, including the proper form of a patent application and
requirements for additional information. 28  The Federal Circuit already has
interpreted this authority broadly, finding that it includes the right to demand a zone
of information beyond what is material to patentability and beyond what is directly
24 Fritz Machlup, Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 135, 147-48.
25 Machlup, supra note 24, at 148.
26 17 C.F.R. § 230.42 1(d) (2008); Michael G. Byers, Eschew Obfuscation-The Merits of the SEC's
Plain English Doctrine, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 135, 137 (2000).
27 For discussion of the SEC plain language program, see Byers, supra note 26, at 137; Andrew T.
Serafin, Kicking the Legalese Habit: The SEC's "Plain English Disclosure " Proposal, 29 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 681 (1998); see also OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ASSISTANCE, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE
DOCUMENTS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf, Steven L. Schooner,
Communicating Governance: Will Plain English Drafting Improve Regulation?, 70 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 163, 169 n.29 (2002). For example, the phrase, "[n]o consideration or surrender of Beco
Stock will be required of shareholders of Beco in return for the shares of Unis Common Stock
issued pursuant to the Distribution" becomes the following: "You will not have to turn in your
shares of Beco stock or pay any money to receive your shares of Unis common stock from the
spin-off." OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ASSISTANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, supra, at 24.
28 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2006).
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useful for supporting a rejection or conclusively deciding the issue of
patentability.29
The penalty for failure to comply with plain language requirements need not
be draconian. It would be unfortunate if such requirements became an additional
weapon in the arsenal of aggressive litigators trying to overturn a patent. Rather,
the PTO could enforce the plain language requirement by requesting that patent
holders rewrite jargon-laden applications as part of the back-and-forth requests for
information during the patent examination process or by denying expedited review
for those who refuse to comply.
30
With SEC disclosure documents, the goal is to translate words that reflect
financial transactions and embody limitations on legal liability into language that a
person with no legal or financial training can understand.3' With plain language
patents, the goal is to translate scientific jargon into language that a legal actor with
little or no scientific background can understand.
Clarifying science is certainly a challenge, but the process of translation from
one field to the next is a challenge faced by fields other than science. As Nussbaum
has noted, philosophy is sometimes written in a fussy and jargon-laden way,
leading people to think that it has nothing to offer the person immersed in life.32
Nevertheless, the history of medical ethics in the United States shows that
philosophers are perfectly capable of learning what they need to learn in order to
speak to professionals in other disciplines. 33
Before I am burned at the stake for heresy, I should explain the limitations of
what I suggest. Plain language patents will not, by any stretch of the imagination,
29 Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S., 393 F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In addition, the Federal Circuit
has expressed approval of PTO regulations that encourage examiners to use the power granted by
Congress to perform the best quality examination possible. See id. (upholding regulation that
allowed examiners to request additional information that would assist with the examination). One
can easily argue that requiring patent information to be drafted in plain language terms that more
clearly communicate the contours of the invention enhances the PTO's ability to perform a quality
examination.
30 Compare UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, ACCELERATED PATENT EXAMINATION
(2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/strat2l/action/aepl0.htm (discussing the
requirements for accelerated examination under the current regulatory schema), with UNITED
STATES SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN No. 7 (1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf7.htm (stating that the SEC may deny acceleration where
there has not been a bona fide effort to comply with the plain English requirements), and Byers,
supra note 26, at 170 (noting the SEC penalty for refusal to comply with plain language
regulations is the right to deny acceleration of the effective dates of registration statements).
31 OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUCATION AND ASSISTANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra
note 27, at 3.
32 Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 1641-42.
33 Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 1642.
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solve all of problems in patent interpretation. 34 Language will always be subject to
varying interpretations, no matter how clear and plain one tries to make it.
Moreover, patents by their very nature describe something innovative. Many patent
holders find themselves in the difficult position of trying to use existing language to
describe something that did not exist when the language was developed. 5
It is also true that an invention described in a patent frequently must be
compared to products that did not exist at the time of the patent. This makes patent
drafting a particularly challenging enterprise, which could suggest that we should
give drafters some leeway to speak in strange tongues. Applying precedent to
circumstances that did not exist at the time the precedent developed, however, is the
essence of interpretation throughout the legal system.36 Patents are no different
from other precedents, such as cases, codes, and constitutions. 37 In short, patent
law, like any other area of law, is essentially a process of legal interpretation, which
must be carried out in the common language of such interpretation.
There are some who would suggest that such an enterprise is doomed from
the start. Philosophers such as Lakoff and Winter argue that there are no concepts
or categories that humans share on an innate level but only metaphors built through
social consensus. 38 These things do not exist on an abstract level but are formed by
34 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (describing the
many possible sources to consider for interpreting claim language and noting that the meaning of a
claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is often not immediately apparent). For
recent discussions of the problems in claim construction, see Andrew S. Brown, Amgen v. HMR:
A Case for Deference in Claim Construction, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 479 (2007); Christopher A.
Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 49 (2005); Andrew B. Dzeguze, Did Markman and Phillips Answer the Right
Question? A Review of the Fractured State of Claim Construction Law and the Potential Use of
Equity to Unify It, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 457 (2007); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction,
Appeal, and the Predictability ofInterpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1033 (2007); Kelly
Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 333 (2007); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics andPatent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61
(2006); Ehab M. Samuel, Phillips v. AWH Corp., Inc.: A Baffling Claim Construction
Methodology, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 519 (2006); David Sanker, Phillips
v. AWH Corp.: No Miracles in Claim Construction, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 101 (2006); Michael
Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215
(2007).
35 See Margaret Jane Radin, The Linguistic Turn in Patent Law 6 (manuscript on file with author)
("Yet patent[s] deal[] with invention, so words must continually be used to describe and delineate
emergent evolving objects; ... trying to make 'old' words describe 'new' things may turn out to
pose special problems."); see also In re Bridgeford, 357 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1966) ("[T]he
right to a patent on an invention is not to be denied because of the limitations of the English
language .... [T]he limitations of known technology concerning the subject matter sought to be
patented should not arbitrarily defeat the right to a patent on an invention.").
36 See FELDMAN, supra note *
See FELDMAN, supra note *.
38 For an extensive description of Lakoff, Winter, and the concepts described in this section, see
generally J. E. Penner, Cognitive Science, Legal Theory, and the Possibility of an
Observation/Theory Distinction in Morality and Law, in LAW AND SCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES 1998 VOL. 1, 1 (Helen Reece ed., 1998).
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our experiences and by the words chosen to describe those experiences.3 9 Words
are "metaphorical mappings" that actually create our understanding of something,
rather than merely identifying it.40 This is true for abstractions like justice, as well
as concrete categories such as food.
From this perspective, the notion of speaking in a common language would
make little sense. There would be no concepts generally shared and therefore no
commonly shared language. In particular, the experiences of scientists and lawyers
would vary so greatly that no common language would be possible.
This notion, which I would call Conceptual Indeterminacy, has been sharply
criticized. A favorite example of mine is Penner's response to Lakoff's analysis of
lust. Lakoff argues that the concept of lust exists only as a construct of the
metaphors we use to describe it, including animal heat, insanity, and automobile
motors.4 ' It does not exist in some abstract, independent manner, but its identity
and form are created by the linguistic devices chosen to describe it and by the
experiences from which we choose those devices.
42
Penner is doubtful that concepts are so dependent on experience and linguistic
devices for their existence.4 3 After all, says Penner, both he and the !Kung
tribesmen would both be able to realize that Fred over there is behaving in a lustful
fashion to Beatrice, even though the tribesmen have never seen an automobile."
Thus, they will be able to understand each other's concept of lust, even if the
metaphors used to describe those concepts arise from experiences that cannot be
shared. a
Although fairly basic, the tribesmen example helps to bring home the notion
that concepts can exist in an independent, enduring fashion outside of our language
or experience. As Fodor explains, "[T]he concept isn't coming from the
environment, it's coming from the organism.'
4 6
Most important, to the extent that experiences do differ, we need to be
particularly wary of using language and metaphors that will be untranslatable
outside of whatever common ground exists. Scientific jargon ensures lack of
translation in a legal setting.
39 Id. at 10.
40 Id. at 11-13 (describing Lakoff and arguing that law is transformative as choices of legal
metaphors alter the way legal doctrine develops).
41 ld. at 11-12.
42 Id. at 10-11.
43 Id. at 23.
44 Penner, supra note 39, at 22-23.
45 Penner, supra note 39, at 23.
46 JERRY FODOR, REPRESENTATIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE
SCIENCE 280 (1981) (explaining this concept in the context of the way children learn language).
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Some who argue for Conceptual Indeterminacy extend this notion to argue
that the language chosen in law is itself transformative.47 Different metaphors
brought into case opinions alter the understanding of the legal doctrine itself and
the view of behavior that should or should not be tolerated.48
Although legal metaphor can be tremendously powerful, it does have its
limits. If law could transform by metaphor, the public by now should be able to
accept unauthorized music downloading as "theft." Nevertheless, only a few
persistent folks, like those whose parents are law professors, actually behave in a
manner that manifests equating music downloading with stealing from a
department store.
Similarly, as Penner notes, some legal metaphors fail because they are simply
counter to our innate understanding of the concepts. 49 For example, attempts to
characterize rape as just another form of theft may have failed because they run
counter to our innate conceptualizations of different actions. 50 To the extent that
such strongly held conceptual views exist, it will be critical to ensure that we are
translating scientific concepts properly so that we know when we are treading on
those concepts that we will be unable to share as a society.
51
In short, speaking a common language would be a valuable step towards
ensuring the proper unfolding of legal analysis. Nevertheless, there are surely those
who will view the idea of describing science in common language as entirely
unrealistic. From this perspective, my comments would fall on the far end of the
spectrum, somewhere between dangerous heresy and delightfully appealing myth.
For them, I would simply note Popper's observation that even myths may contain
important truths. 5
2
III. Avoiding Structural Insularity
While language can affect our ability to have a coherent and effective legal
conversation, structural elements of the legal system also play an important role.
Tribunals that are isolated and insulated are more likely to succumb to troubling
47 See Penner, supra note 38, at 12-13 (citing Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1188-92
(1989) (linking the development of First Amendment rights to a change in the metaphor
describing free speech from a free-flowing river to a marketplace)).
48 See Penner, supra note 38, at 12-13.
49Penner, supra note 38, at 3233.
50 Penner, supra note 38, at 32-33.
51 Cf Penner, supra note 38, at 33 (noting that resistance to legal concepts that flow from
discordance with our innate conceptualizations should be taken seriously).
52 Karl R. Popper, Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report, in BRITISH PHILOSOPHY IN THE MID-
CENTURY 155, 162 (C.A. Mace ed., 1957) (arguing that "historically speaking, all (or nearly all)
scientific theories originate from myths, and that a myth may contain important anticipations of
scientific theories").
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temptations. It becomes easier for them to hide behind technical lines and technical
terms rather than engaging in the type of hard analysis necessary to grapple with
difficult legal dilemmas.
The strongest example of this problem can be found in the tribulations of the
modem Federal Circuit. Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in 1982 and designated, among other things, that the court would hear all
circuit level patent appeals.53 The Federal Circuit was intended to bring rationality
and uniformity to federal patent appeals, on the theory that an appellate group with
greater experience in this challenging area could produce a more coherent body of
law. 4 In particular, Congress was concerned about the inconsistency with which
federal appeals courts upheld or overturned the validity of patents. 55
The Federal Circuit, hailed with such great enthusiasm at the time of its
founding, has received unrelenting criticism in the subsequent decades. The Circuit
has failed to provide consistency in patent law in general or in the question of
patent validity in particular.5 6  Most troubling, the Federal Circuit has proven
53 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006)) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction... (1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court. .. if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on [a civil action relating to
patents] .... ).
54 Id; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 651 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "divergence among the federal circuits in their interpretation
of patent issues provided support for the congressional decision in 1982 to consolidate appellate
jurisdiction of patent appeals in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit"); Matthew D. Henry
& John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's Impact on Patent Litigation, 35
J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 (2006).
55 Henry & Turner, supra note 54, at 86.
56 See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 177 (2005) (arguing that "[c]laim construction jurisprudence is in
disarray" and noting that "the Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a
worryingly high rate"); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction
More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231 (2005) (documenting a "concern among
the bench and bar that the Federal Circuit's de novo review of district court claim construction
decisions and lack of guidance have caused considerable unpredictability"); see also Donald S.
Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 340 (2005)
(discussing claims that the Federal Circuit engages in "erratic and unpredictable decision-
making"); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and
Interpretation at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1027, 1094 (2007) (arguing that
despite the nearly seamless consensus of problems related to de novo review of patent claim
construction, it is "the indeterminacy of patent law, rather than the application of patent law by the
district courts, or the Federal Circuit's review of the district courts, that is responsible for the
current circumstances of patent litigation"); John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The
Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 781,
792-93 (2005) (discussing unpredictable judicial claim construction in the Federal Circuit); R.
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV 1105, 1179 (2004) (concluding that whether the Federal
Circuit is succeeding is an open question).
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incapable of resolving the disagreements and inconsistencies that arise within the
circuit, allowing splits among panels to fester unresolved across decades.
Consider the disarray in Federal Circuit doctrine related to so-called product-
by-process claims. As a general matter, patent claims are divided into claims for
the product, that is, for a particular item of inventions no matter how it is made, or
claims for a process, that is, for a method of doing something. 57 A third category of
claims is called product-by-process. 58 In 1991, a Federal Circuit panel ruled in the
Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc. case that a product-by-
process claim would cover not only the product made by the process specified but
also the product made in any other manner. 59  The panel decision appeared
questionable, in light of earlier case precedent, including an old nineteenth century
Supreme Court decision.6 ° One might also argue that the decision appeared
questionable in light of the common sense notion of the words "product-by-
process," but as noted above, common sense does not always prevail in patent law.
In the year after Scripps, a different Federal Circuit panel ruled to the contrary
that product-by-process claims cover only the product made by the process
specified. 6' The later case was entitled Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex
Corp.62  In Atlantic Thermoplastics, the panel acknowledged the earlier Scripps
decision but argued that Scripps was not binding on the grounds that "[a] decision
that fails to consider Supreme Court precedent does not control if the court
determines that the prior panel would have reached a different conclusion if it had
considered controlling precedent., 63 In other words, the Atlantic Thermoplastics
panel argued that if a prior panel decision disregarded precedent, later panels were
not obliged to follow it.
64
The issue should have been ripe for consideration of the full Federal Circuit
en banc, either on the merits of the definition of a product-by-process claim or on
57 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02, § 1.03 (2008).
58 3 id. at § 8.05.
59 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
60 Plummer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. 442, 449 (1887) (holding that "[i]t seems necessarily to follow from
this view either that the Tucker patents are void by reason of the anticipation practiced by
Brocksieper, or that the patented process and product must be restricted to exactly what is
described"); cf Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1583 (holding that "[s]ince claims must be construed the
same way for validity and for infringement, the correct reading of product-by-process claims is
that they are not limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the claims"); 1 IvER P.
COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 5:6 (2001) (stating that a product-by-process claim
would be infringed only by a product that is created by the recited process).
61 Atl. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 838 n.2.
64 Id.
[VOL. 17:289
HeinOnline  -- 17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 300 2008-2009
2009] Plain Language Patents 301
the precedential question of whether a panel of the court is allowed to ignore a prior
panel's decision. The Federal Circuit denied a rehearing en banc nevertheless,
prompting an angry dissent from one member of the court that regardless of the
merits of the matter, the second panel's action is not only insulting to colleagues on
the prior panel, "it is mutiny. It is heresy. It is illegal. 65  The broader court,
however, was unmoved.6 6
The Federal Circuit's resistance to precedent is also evident in the doctrine of
patent misuse and its relationship to antitrust law. Prior to 1986, courts had defined
patent misuse as an impermissible attempt to expand the time or scope of the
67patent. In the 1986 case of Windsurfing International, Inc. v. AMf, Inc.,
however, Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit changed the definition to an
impermissible attempt to expand the time or scope of the patent with
anticompetitive effect. 68 In the Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seifjhart opinion nine months
later, Judge Markey retreated from his earlier decision, noting in a footnote that
while modem economic theory would suggest bringing patent misuse in line with
antitrust law, any change would have to await action by the Supreme Court or
Congress.69 In 1988, the Senate tried to do just that, passing a bill that would have
prohibited a finding of patent misuse unless the patent holder's actions violated
antitrust laws .70 The language was dropped, however, from the final version of the
Act.7 '
Despite these failed efforts, a Federal Circuit panel in the 1992 Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. case returned to the language requiring anticompetitive effect
for a finding of patent misuse.72 The decision cited the Windsurfing case, ignoring
its later retraction in Senza-Gel as well as the failed Congressional effort.73 Later
panels have tried to harmonize Mallinckrodt with earlier precedents, leaving a
65 Atil. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp, 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Rich, J., dissenting from denial of
reh'g en banc).
66 Id. at 1279.
67 For a description of the history of patent misuse as well as the Federal Circuit's modem exploits in
this doctrinal area, see Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent
Misuse, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 399, 418 (2003).
68 Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Id.
69 Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 665 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
70 Jere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Misuse
Doctrine, 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH 257, 264 (1991) (citing the Intellectual Property Antitrust
Protection Act of 1988, S. 438, 100th Cong. § 201 (2d Sess. 1988)).
71 Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed be the Tie?," 4 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 2 n.9 (1991) (citing the Patent and Trademark Authorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-703 § 201, 102 Stat. 4674 (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(d))).
72 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
73 Id. at 706.
HeinOnline  -- 17 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 301 2008-2009
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL
confused doctrine which recites the mantra that patent misuse is a broader wrong
than antitrust law while essentially applying antitrust law. 4
The Federal Circuit's reluctance to resolve disagreements also appears in the
written description doctrine. 75 In recent decades, the Federal Circuit has identified
within the disclosure doctrines of patent law a separate written description
doctrine.76 The doctrine has caused considerable consternation as courts and
litigants have tried to understand the logic for the doctrine as well as the contours of
it. 77 In 2002, a government brief noted in a polite understatement that "[a]lthough
this Court has addressed the 'written description' requirement of section 112 on a
number of occasions, its decisions have not taken a clear and uniform position
regarding the purpose and meaning of the requirement.
7 8
The Federal Circuit had an opportunity to address the issue in 2004 in an en
banc petition for the case of University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., which
had applied the written description doctrine. 79 The court refused to take the case en
banc, and the denial produced five separate dissenting and concurring opinions
arguing over whether the doctrine should exist and what its contours should be.8 °
Problems in the Federal Circuit are not surprising. In fact, they are
structurally predictable. The Federal Circuit cannot benefit from the balancing
effects that may occur with multi-circuit consideration of the same issues. While
any isolated court is at risk, a court with a primary focus on scientific cases is
particularly vulnerable. Courts can easily lose themselves in the technical aspects
of the cases, which provide camouflage for the failure to resolve issues or to resolve
74 Feldman, supra note 67, at 430-31.
75 For a discussion of the emergence of the written description doctrine and subsequent problems,
see Feldman, supra note 11; see also Paula K. Davis, Questioning the Requirement for Written
Description: Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe and Overly Broad Patent Cases, 37 IND. L. REv. 467,
499-500 (2004) (discussing the effect of the Enzo Biochem and Gen-Probe cases on the written
description requirement); Cynthia M. Lambert, Gentry Gallery and the Written Description
Requirement, 7 B.U. J. Sd. & TECH. L. 109, 139 (2001) (indicating that Gentry Gallery extended
the stricter written description standard to the predictable arts); Daniel P. Chisholm, The Effect of
the USPTO's Written Description Guidelines on Gene Patent Applications, 35 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 543, 569-70 (2001) (stating that the PTO Guidelines have incorporated the Federal Circuit's
stricter written description standard for biotechnology patents).
76 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
For a description of the original appearance of the separate written description doctrine and the
later expansion of that doctrine in the Eli Lilly case, see Feldman, supra note 11, at 8-9.
77 See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1314-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) (denial of reh'g en banc) (listing seven law review articles defending the Eli Lilly
written description requirement, thirty-one criticizing the requirement, and sixteen giving the
holding neutral treatment as illustration of the confusion generated by the decision).
78 Id. at 1309 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing En
Banc at 4, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1230)).
Id. at 1303.
80 Id. at 1304-26.
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them in a rational manner. In addition, the parties tend to shroud themselves in
jargon, which can obscure the issues at hand for both the Federal Circuit and for the
Supreme Court justices who might consider wading into the issues.
Supervision can ameliorate the problems of isolation, but there is a limit to
the amount of energy the Supreme Court can devote to one circuit. Although the
Court has recently begun to accept a number of appeals from the Federal Circuit, it
has taken decades for the Court to engage extensively with Federal Circuit
doctrines, 81 and the Supreme Court cannot single handedly compensate for the
structural inadequacies of the Federal Circuit design. In short, courts that must
engage in scientific analysis should be integrated, not isolated.
The need to encourage a common language of communication and our
experiences with the Federal Circuit should cast doubt on recent legislative
proposals, such as a recent bill to create separate intellectual property courts 82 and a
bill to allow district court judges to defer patent cases to colleagues considered
better-versed in patent law.83 These legislative proposals echo other calls in recent
years to create specialized tribunals including drug courts, community courts,
mental health courts, and domestic violence courts.8 4
Such moves are likely to fuel the temptation to obscure difficult issues in a
blaze of technical terms. The goal should be to encourage translation of scientific
terms into understandable concepts, rather than to indulge jargon by creating its
own forum.
See Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit's Patent Law Decisions in 2006: A
New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793,
798 (2007) (citing commentary in the mid-1990s, which concluded that the Supreme Court rarely
took cases from the Federal Circuits and exhibited even more deference to the Federal Circuit on
substantive patent law issues than on other substantive law issues, and comparing that to the
current wave of Supreme Court interest in Federal Circuit cases in general and patent cases in
particular); see also Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Address to the Federal Circuit Judicial
Conference on the State of the Court (May 15, 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court grants
certiorari in roughly one percent of the petitions filed, with a slightly higher rate of acceptance for
petitions arising out of the Federal Circuit).
82 H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. § 1 (2d Sess. 2006); see also SpeciallP Trial Courts A Bad Idea, Lawyers
Say, IP LAW 360, Feb. 1, 2006, http://www.law360.com/articles/5183 (subscription required). But
see also Lefstin, supra note 56, at 1094 (arguing that specialized trial courts would undoubtedly
improve patent litigation); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 932-34 (2001) (arguing in favor of
specialized patent trial courts in order to deter forum shopping). The bill passed the House in
2007, but died in the Senate. Sung, supra note 7, at 28.
83 Jordan, House OKs Specialized Patent Judges, NoWPUBLIC.COM, (Feb. 13, 2007),
http://www.nowpublic.com/house-oksspecialized.patent judges.
84 Sung, supra note 7, at 27.
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IV. Conclusion
Nowhere is the process of interpretation more difficult than where law and
science interact in the form of drafting and interpreting patents. The multitude of
unfamiliar terms and concepts exacerbates the problems inherent in developing
appropriate legal doctrines to encourage scientific innovation. Where the legal
system must interact with science in this challenging manner, we should move
towards speaking in a common language, one that will be susceptible to the process
of interpretation and adaptation that is essential to law. Whenever possible, we
should avoid the creation of languages and forums that are insulated from the
common discourse.
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